REMARKS

Reconsideration and allowance of the above-referenced application are respectfully requested.

Additional changes are made to claim 17 responsive to the comment in the advisory action about Brett column 10 lines 27-40. It is noted that Brett does in fact discuss in column 10 the notion of keeping the connection open "over multiple responses, allowing the server to send more data at will". Brett describes that this may be more efficient, since new HTTP connections do not need to be reopened.

However, it should be noted that this is opening only <u>connection with a single server</u>, and there is no disclosure of the subject matter of claim 17, where the request is used to open "plural Internet pages on plural different Internet servers" as claimed. This subject matter allows the unexpected advantage of allowing obtaining of more information from multiple different websites, which is not possible using the prior art.

The previously-stated remarks are resubmitted.

Claims 1-2, 9, and 17 stand rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph, as allegedly failing to comply with the written description requirement. In response, these claims have been extensively reviewed in view of the exact language in the specification. Note that this language contemplated the notion of a device that sent

requests and form reformatted those requests based on communication with another Web server. One of those devices, for example, might be a text messaging device. See generally paragraphs 6 and 12 to describes this subject matter. However, applicant agrees that even though the exact language of the current claims was not in the specification. The claims are amended to obviate this.

However, in order to obviate this interpretation, claims 1-2 have been amended to remove the words objected to such as variable portions and formatting. Instead, this uses terms directly from the specification, such as "reformatting said results". Claim 9 has been amended to remove the objected to language, of the "only the variable portions". In order to obviate the interpretation that requests to websites are not properly correlated with templates, claim 9 specifies the first and second functions, not webpages, using different templates. New claims has been added, to recite that the first function is bank balance and the second function is stock information. All this is clearly supported in paragraph 40 of the original specification.

Claim 17 has been similarly amended.

The indefiniteness rejection to claim 2 has been obviated herein by amendment.

Claim 16 and 19 stand rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph as allegedly failing to comply with the written description requirement. This queries

the claim language that a first request always uses a first template and a second request always uses a second template. (Note – the quoted word "always" in no longer in the claims) The specification paragraph 40 describes the different functions (bank balance and stocks) using different templates. These claims have been amended to more-clearly follow paragraph 40.

Claim 1 stands objected to as not showing the information that cannot access the first server. The specification clearly describes text messages being used, e-mails being used, and an HTML server being used. From this, it is believed that it would be understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art that the first information could not be used to access the server. However, and in order to obviate this interpretation, the claims have been amended.

Claims 1,3, 13-14, 17-18 and 20 stand rejected under 35 USC 103 as allegedly being unpatentable over Brett in view of Steele. The claims are amended to obviate this rejection.

Brett shows an event ticket auctioning system. As part of this auctioning system, the user can get updated information, and that updated information can be reformatted. Brett describes how different participants may all access the same central computer through remote terminals, see for example column 5 beginning line 66 through column 6 lines 5. An auction is open, and users can submit bids

and receive results as part of that auction. Part of the function, for example described column 9, is to make sure that the seats that are provided are contiguous.

The rejection states that Brett teaches querying sources of information, referring to column 7 lines 39-67. This portion describes how the central computer receives bid information from remote terminals, as webpages that are constructed of HTML code. The bid information is received of the response to a webpage form. Brett discloses that when a new bid comes in, these old bids are reviewed.

However, nowhere is there any teaching or suggestion of the subject matter defined by claim 1, where the results are received from multiple different sources of information and different templates display the received information in a different format. Brett allows receiving bids on an HTML form for multiple different clients. Nothing in Brett teaches different templates, and in fact such would not make sense in Brett, since all the information is about the same subject – internet bids.

Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 USC 100 3A as allegedly being unpatentable over Rajan. This contention is respectfully traversed. Rajan teaches a system that aggregates different information to return as part of a personalized webpage. As part of this, Rajan does describe reformatting text into a form that can be used to query a server. See for example, Rajan's paragraph bridging column 6-7.

Claim seven defines that the template is information used to purchase a product, and this is not shown by any of the cited prior art.

Claim 9 has been amended to recite a first function uses the first template and the second function uses a second template. The rejection alleges that this is shown by Rajan, however it is respectfully suggested that this is based on hindsight rather than the subject matter of Rajan's teaching.

Nothing in Rajan discloses or suggests different templates being used for a different function. Rajan does describe that different sources of information can be added in to the single date book or memo pad application, see paragraph 13-14, but does not describe that different templates can be used for the different functions. Rajan discusses a "scripted template", col 7 line 13, which is used to access the information on the web. The "output template" is described col 8 line 66, and is described as being "generic" to all the parameters and presentation. In fact, Rajan appears to intend that all the different "functions" each be displayed on one composite with one composite template. Therefore, claim 9 should be allowable for these reasons along with claims that depend there from.

Claim 17 has been amended to recite using the request from the client to open multiple different Internet pages on multiple different servers. This was rejected over Brett in view of Steele. While Brett does teach getting information from an HTML form, it does not disclose the operation of actually opening plural

Internet pages on multiple different servers as claimed by claim 17, and therefore

claim 17 should be allowable for these reasons.

It is believed that all of the pending claims have been addressed in this

paper. However, failure to address a specific rejection, issue or comment, does not

signify agreement with or concession of that rejection, issue or comment. In

addition, because the arguments made above are not intended to be exhaustive,

there may be reasons for patentability of any or all pending claims (or other

claims) that have not been expressed. Finally, nothing in this paper should be

construed as an intent to concede any issue with regard to any claim, except as

specifically stated in this paper, and the amendment of any claim does not

necessarily signify concession of unpatentability of the claim prior to its

amendment.

Please charge any unpaid fees due in connection with this response to

Deposit Account No. 50-1387.

Respectfully submitted,

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